The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs started in 1957, as a result of an appeal by Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein and nine other world-renowned scientists to the world scientific community to meet together in order to consider the dangers of nuclear war and to reach a common understanding on measures for avoiding nuclear dis aster and for helping to arouse world public opinion toward this end. The first Conference, held in Pugwash, Nova Scotia (Canada) in July 1957, demonstrated the possibility of scien tists, from many countries with different and conflicting ideologies, meeting together as individuals, unofficially, to apply the spirit and approach of science, and its common language, to the solution of the most vexing and difficult problems facing mankind.
Since 1957 there have been held, under the Pugwash banner, 23 Con ferences and 18 Topical Symposia, at which some 700 of the world's most distinguished and influential scientists and scholars from around 50 countries have met privately, as individuals, and discussed a great variety of problems, ranging from the control over nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, national and international security issues, scientific and technical co-operation in various realms, the responsibilities of scientists and the application of science and technology for the impro vement of the lot of the developing world.
At the most recent Pugwash Confer ence, held in Finland in September 1973 the Working Group considering "Radioactive Pollution of the Environ ment in the Context of the Energy Problem" prepared a report of which some excerpts follow. Although the Conference as a whole heard and discussed the report, its content are he responsibility of the mem bers of that Working Group. (No votes are taken at Pugwash Confer ences, nor is there any attempt at issuing statements from the Confer ence as a whole ; any public state ment in entirely the responsibility of the Conferences' 20-members Inter national Continuing Committee).
The discussions of this Working Group took place in what might be referred to as a "happier time", as far as energy problems are con cerned. Certainly, it would be difficult today to maintain the tone of reser ved optimism -concerning the possibility of postponing, or at least limiting the widespread adoption of nuclear fission power in the next de cade -that characterizes the report. Nevertheless, or perhaps even be cause of the accelerated motion towards fission power that is a politi cal consequence of this year's "energy crisis", the issues and the problems raised in this report assume, in my view, an even greater impor tance. The problems and dangers will be with us for a long time to come, and if statements such as this can have any influence in averting the human disasters and suffering that could result from a hasty and care less pursuit of energy abundance, we should all be extremely grateful.
B.T. Feld
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Preamble
The principal elements of the pre sent energy dilemma are : 1. there is an urgent need to in crease energy production in most countries, especially the deve loping ones ; 2. in the long run this need cannot be met by using the finite and non-renewable fossil fuels, and even in the short run perhaps should not be met in this way, owing both to environmental ef fects and to the need for reserving some part of these materials for other necessary purposes (e.g. chemical synthesis, proteins, scarce elements) ; 3. however, the dangers of radioac tive pollution and of diversion of fissile materials for weaponry in crease rapidly with the growing number and size of fission power plants, which are presently the principal alternative to fossil fuels.
Fission Energy Problems and Alternatives
Need for fission energy and assess ment of its ultimate potential A variety of factors influence the degree of the world's need for fission as an energy source and the ultimate potential of this technology. These factors include future growth rates of energy consumption, the forms in which energy will be needed, desires for national self-suffiency in energy, and the characteristics of technolo gical alternatives to fission : potential magnitude, economic and technical feasibility, environmental consequen ces in comparison to those of fission, and the time horizon on which they can be made available.
In recent years, energy use in both rich countries and poor countries has been growing at an average rate of about 5 per cent per year. Electricity, now accounting for about 25 per cent of all energy consumption, has been growing much faste r : 7 to 10 per cent per year in much of the world. Continuation of these rates would give a 4-fold increase in world energy consumption by the year 2000. The actual expansion, however, will de pend in part on how energy growth is distributed. Growth of energy use is much more badly needed in poor countries than in rich ones, and a more sensible goal than equally rapid growth in all countries would be dis tributing growth with the ultimate goal of achieving a roughly uniform level of per capita consumption in all countries. In any case, if it is con ceded that the most urgent needs for energy growth are in the poor coun tries, nuclear fission is at a disad vantage because large nuclear plants are not well suited to the presently small and dispersed needs in these countries.
The potential of nuclear fission as an energy source will not be limited in magnitude in the foreseeable future by shortage of fuel, even in the event that breeder reactors are not de ployed. The cost of electricity gene rated in light-water reactors and gas reactors is already so insensitive to the cost of raw uranium that very abundant low grade ores could be utilized without increasing the price of electricity drastically. If all else were equal, breeder reactors would be preferable because they exploit 30 to 60 times more of the potential energy contained in the uranium. But the impact of the breeder on the sa fety question and on the issue of plutonium diversion should be care fully assessed before their large-scale deployment can be supported, and the world uranium supply situation over at least the next 50 years is such that from this point of view haste is unnecessary.
How soon the use of fission energy or others forms will be limited by en vironmental factors is not clear. Cli mate on a hemispheric or global scale could conceivably be appreciably in fluenced by CO2 and particulate matter from fossil fuel combustion early in the next century, and the heat from energy consumption in all forms could influence climate over regions of 10's to 100's of thousands of square kilometres by the year 2000. Understanding of global meteorolo gical processes is inadequate to per mit prediction of the level of energy use at which climatic disruption could become drastic ; although some scien tists have suggested that an increase of energy use by a factor of 50 might be too much. Use of solar energy, which already takes part in the global energy balance in its natural form, could alleviate the thermal limit to some degree.
Wide differences of opinion exist on the potential of alternatives to nuclear fission, principally fusion, solar energy, geothermal energy, and clea ner use of fossil fuels. On the one hand, there is no obvious barrier to development of fusion, large-scale so lar energy, or geothermal energy on a time scale of 20 to 50 years, and theses sources evidently have many environmental advantages. On the other hand, the full difficulties and environmental liabilities of these ap proaches may remain to be disco vered, while those of fission are al ready well known. The Working Group was in complete agreement that greatly expanded research program mes on the potential alternatives to fission -and especially the appa rently "clean" and thermally advan tageous solar and geothermal possi bilities -are urgently needed and fully justified.
Current relations and practices gover ning the release of radioactivity
A distinction must be made bet ween routine releases of radioactivity in the everyday operations related to commercial nuclear power, on the one hand, and the much larger, unplanned and uncontrolled releases that could result from accidents, natural disas ters, sabotage, or acts of war, on the other.
First, with respect to routine emis sions at nuclear installations other than waste repositories, it was agreed that it is technically feasible and desirable to hold the radiation expo sure to members of the public below levels of one per cent or less of the average "natural background" ra diation. Two further points must be emphasized : first, better data for comparing the health effects of fis sion and fossil fuels ought to be ob tained, especially on the fossil fuel side -comparisons should be con tinually updated as new data become available ; second, great technical and regulatory vigilance will be required to see that the theoretical potential for routine emissions far below one per cent of the natural background is actually achieved in practice around the world.
With respect to the management of long-lived radioactive wastes, strong uncertainties still exist. The principal difficulty is that the material remains highly toxic for periods mea sured in thousands of years ; even over shorter spans, predictions about the stability and continuity of human society are impossible, and over the longer term significant geological change is possible in some circum stances. It is not surprising that even the "experts" cannot yet agree on what methods can guarantee the iso lation of wastes over such periods, in spite of the existence of a variety of proposals (ranging from disposal in the earth's core to sending the wastes into space). Disposal in deep salt beds appears attractive, and is already being practiced in the Federal German Republic, but the viability of the me thod depends on the geological de tails of the particular salt deposit. Much more money could be spent on nuclear waste management than has yet been contemplated, without grea tly increasing the price of nuclear generated electricity, but money alone does not guarantee a solution. It is impossible to be complacent about expansion of the use of nuclear power without having a solution actually in hand.
The possibility of a major release of radioactivity from a reactor or a fuel reprocessing plant, which theo retically could result from an accident, a natural disaster (e.g. earthquake, tsunami), sabotage, or an act of war, has justifiably created deep concern. A major release could conceivably in volve thousand of millions of curies of radioactivity, hundreds of thousands to millions of casualties if it occurred near a population centre, and many thousand of millions of dollars in pro perty damage. In theory the proba bility of such an event is quite small, but perhaps not small enough. This means that reactors should not be sited in earthquake or tsunami zones. Experts have published estimates of the probability of a major reactor ac cident (excluding sabotage and war, and perhaps some kinds of natural disasters) ranging from 10̵ to 10-12 per reactor year. Better estimates of accident probability would be desir able. In the absence of agreement or proof, it is only prudent to assume the worst. Siting near large centres of population should be avoided. It is possible, although disputed, that siting reactors 100 metres or more underground in solid rock may pro vide further insurance against the consequences of major accidents. This possibility should be vigorously researched.
Diversion of fissionable materials
The use of nuclear reactors to ge nerate electricity necessarily involves the production and handling of fission able materials of a character suitable for the manufacture of nuclear wea pons. Light-water and heavy-water reactors yield 200 to 400 grams of plutonium per Mwe-yr, net. Breeder reactors yield between 300 and 700 grams of plutonium per Mwe-yr, net. High-temperature gas-cooled reactors of US design employ fuel fully en riched in the fissile uranium isotope, U-235, and yield in the order of 50 g of fissile U-233 net per Mwe-yr. In each case mentioned, the materials require at most chemical separation to be rendered usable for the pro duction of weapons. It is to be em phasized that the high Pu-240 content of plutonium produced in LWRs does not make bomb manufacture impos sible, as is often supposed, but only complicates the design and makes the yield both smaller and less pre dictable.
There are two principal classes of possibilities for the misuse of the fissionable material from the nu clear fuel cycle ; first, a government without nuclear weapons may divert material from its own non-military nuclear programme in order to pro duce weapons ; second, material may be stolen from the nuclear power pro grammes of either weapons or nonweapons nations by individuals or groups with a variety of motivesthe production of a weapon for sabo tage, terrorism or blackmail, or the sale of the material to another group or even a nation intent on weapons production.
The problem of theft of nuclear material by internal groups or indi viduals intent on sabotage, terrorism or blackmail was agreed to be a very serious one, although there was some sentiment expressed that the possibi lity of such activity was much smaller in the socialist states. In any case, the problem cannot be avoided simply by abandoning the breeder reactors, be cause, as noted above, all other reactor types also involve the use of materials suitable for weapons manu facture. It is difficult to see how the theft of such material can be made impossible in a world characterized by human failings, but measures to make such theft more difficult should be carefully studied and the best ones implemented as soon as possible. For example, relatively, unsophisticated clandestine weapons manufacture might be deterred by maximizing the PU-240 content of reactor plutonium, adulterating material to be shipped with other neutron emitters or neutron poisons, or adulteration with hard gamma emitter to aid detection. Another possibility is to minimize ship ments by concentrating enrichment, fuel fabrication and fuel reprocessing facilities at single sites together with several reactors, and guarding the en tire area with a degree of elaborate ness and thoroughness hitherto re served for strategic weapons.
The general view of the Working Group regarding radiological terrorism using plutonium stolen from reactor programmes is that this problem is definitely of secondary importance to that of clandestine nuclear weapons, in part because a variety of other ex tremely toxic substances could be ob tained by terrorists with less difficulty.
Breeder reactors
None of the problems described in the foregoing sections are signifi cantly diminished in the case of breeder reactors, most especially the liquid-metal cooled fast breeder now favoured by all countries, and some are significantly aggravated. The rela tively low fraction of Pu-240 in pluto nium produced by breeder reactors, in contrast to that from light water reac tors, worsens the problems of theft and diversion, as does the greater quantity of plutonium produced by the usual breeder cycle. Additionally, some aspects of the reactor safety problem would appear to be com pounded in the case of the breeder. On the basis of available data most Group members felt that the breeder is not necessary in the next 50 years on grounds of uranium supply, and, therefore, that there is no need to consider large scale deployment of such reactors unless and until the questions of diversion and safety are fully resolved. Some members, how ever, disagreed with this view.
Summary of recommendations
1. Owing to potentially grave and as yet unresolved problems related to waste management, diversion of fissionable material, and major radioactivity releases arising from accidents, natural disasters, sabo tage, or acts of war, the wisdom of a commitment to nuclear fission as a principal energy source for mankind must be seriously ques tioned at the present time. 2. Accordingly, research and deve lopment on alternative energy sources -particularly solar, geo thermal and fusion energy, and cleaner technologies for fossil fuels-should be greatly acce lerated. 3. Broadly based studies aimed at the assessment of the relation bet ween genuine and sustainable energy needs, as opposed to pro jected demands, are required. These topics will be treated in ple nary and parallel sessions. The pa rallel sessions (four or five) should take various forms : -Seminars on some of the plenary lectures -Seminars on problems which may or may not be related to the main six topics -Symposia with contributed papers on specialized subjects.
Society News
Energy and Physics
One, at least, of the parallel ses sions, will be systematically devoted to the development of fundamental physics. It is also planned to include a discussion on teaching of physics in Europe.
Meetings
The meetings in this list are all organized by Divisions and Sections of EPS (boxed) or sponsored by EPS. Europhysics Study Conferences are marked by an E before the date.
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